The Age Dependency Ratio – A Demographic Overview of the World

2008 was as significant a year from a demographic perspective as it was from a financial one. In 2008 the world’s age dependency ratio —  the number of people who are either younger than 15 or older than 65, relative to the number of people aged 15-65 — reached its lowest ever point. From a peak of approximately .77 in 1967, the world’s age dependency ratio fell to a floor of .54 in 2008, a level it has remained at every year in the decade since. (Or, to put it another way, which may be more intuitive, the percentage of the world’s population that is 15-65 years old reached its highest point in 2008 – 65 percent – and remains there today). This record low is not likely to be broken any time soon. The United Nations predicts that the dependency ratio will rise again during the generation ahead, albeit gradually, as more Baby Boomers become seniors and as birth rates continue to fall worldwide.


The age dependency ratio is a useful, though obviously imperfect, measure of economic potential. The higher a country’s dependency ratio, the heavier the economic burden (to put it crudely) its working-age population may need to bear. The country with the highest dependency ratio in the world, Niger, with a ratio of 1.12, has 1.12 children or senior citizens for every 15-65-year-old adult. The country with the lowest dependency ratio, South Korea, with a ratio of .38, has nearly three adults for every one child or senior citizen. The Gulf Arab kingdoms have even lower ratios than that (the United Arab Emirates’ is just .18!), but only because they have so many temporary foreign workers (mostly, men) living within their borders.

Middle-income countries have had their age dependency ratios fall quickly during the past generation

It is not surprising that a lower dependency ratio tends to correlate with economic success. Not only is a country with fewer dependents more able to invest its time and money in increasing its productivity, but productive countries also tend to have low birth rates, which keep dependency levels low in the short-term (though not, of course, in the long term). As such, a low dependency ratio can be both a cause and an effect of economic growth. Even the oldest country in the world, Japan, only has a dependency ratio of .66, far lower than those of the young countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.


In recent history, the correlation between economic growth and age dependency can be seen most clearly in East Asia. China’s rapid economic growth has tracked its dependency ratio’s steep fall, while Japan’s stalled economic growth has tracked its own dependency ratio’s rise. China’s dependency ratio, which is today the lowest in the world apart from South Korea (not counting city-states or the Gulf Arab monarchies), was almost twice as high a generation ago, and only fell below the US’s in 1990.

That same year, Japan’s age dependency ratio fell below that of a newly reunified Germany to become the lowest in the world, apart from Singapore or Hong Kong. An aging population has since made Japan’s dependency ratio become by far the highest in the developed world, however. Japan’s ratio has also risen higher than those of many developing nations in recent years, even than some of the world’s poorest nations outside of Sub-Saharan Africa, such as Haiti:


Outside Japan, East Asia now has the lowest dependency ratios of any region, by far. Not only China and South Korea but also Thailand, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Malaysia, and even North Korea all have ratios between .38-.44, the lowest in the world anywhere outside of the Persian Gulf. Indonesia’s too, at .48, is now lower than those of most countries in the world. And the Philippines, the major outlier in the region with a dependency ratio of .57, no longer has a high ratio by global standards either.

This trend, however, is finally beginning to change. China’s ratio has begun to rise since 2010, prompting many to worry that the country “will become old before it becomes rich”. The dependency ratios of Vietnam, Thailand, and South Korea have also begun rising during the past several years. And Japan’s already high ratio will continue to rise quickly unless it finally decides to raise its extremely low immigration rate.


The years 2008-2010, in addition to being when the global dependency ratio and the Chinese dependency ratio both reached their lowest levels, was also when the EU’s dependency ratio rose higher than that of the US, for the first time since 1984. The EU’s dependency burden has continued to rise relative to the US in the decade since, a fact that has perhaps contributed, at least to a minor extent, to the US’s stronger economic performance during this period.

Indeed, at the risk of attributing far more significance to the age dependency ratio than is justified, I will also point out the fact that countries in Central Europe have enjoyed a much lower ratio and a much stronger economic performance than has the EU as a whole. Similarly, Canada has had the lowest dependency ratio and, especially before oil prices fell in 2015, one of the strongest economies among rich Western nations during the past two decades. Dependency burdens in Canada and Central Europe were particularly low during the financial crisis:


Another intriguing case is Italy, which has a ratio that has been rising at fast pace since 2010, at the same time as its economy has become perhaps the primary point of concern in European politics. A similar trend has existed throughout Southern Europe, with the ratios of Greece, Spain, and France reaching high levels in the years after 2010. Although it is actually France which has the highest dependency ratio of these countries, a result of its having a relatively large population of children, it is Italy which has their highest old age dependency ratio (population older than 65, relative to population 15-65):

Above is an Old Age Dependency Ratio chart. Italy has the highest Old Age Dependency Ratio in western Europe, but several countries in eastern Europe (which are not shown on this chart) are just as high — and Japan is highest of all, by a significant margin. In Japan, there are now only two 15-65-year-old adults for every one senior citizen, whereas even in Italy the ratio of 15-65-year-old adults to seniors is still roughly 2.75-to-1. In contrast, Japan, South Korea, Italy, Germany, Portugal, and several other European countries are more or less tied for having the lowest “Young Age Dependency Ratioin the world (as usual, with the exception of Gulf Arab mini-monarchies, Hong Kong, and Singapore, which have even lower ratios). They each have only about one-fifth the number of kids below 15 years old as adults between the ages of 15-65. On the opposite extreme, Niger is now the only country in the world to have more 0-15 year olds than 15-65 year olds. 

If we look at Europe as a whole, including countries in its surrounding region, we can see there is a divergence occurring between northern and southern countries. Northern countries such as Germany, Russia, and Poland, which have had some of the lowest dependency burdens in the world in recent decades, will see sharp increases in the years ahead because their largest population cohorts are approaching 65 years old and they have few teenagers approaching 15 years old. (An exception to this is Ireland, where the largest age cohort is 35-40 years old. Irish birth rates were relatively high until the 1990s).

Mediterranean countries, in contrast, will have their dependency ratios rise more slowly, either because they have more children or because (particularly in Spain) their largest age cohorts are now only in their forties rather than their fifties. Within the EU this is especially true of France, which has had high birth rates by European standards. It is, however, even more true of non-EU Mediterranean countries such as Turkey and Tunisia. These countries used to have far higher ratios than the EU or Russia, but no longer do today:

This fall in dependency in places like Turkey and North Africa is part of a greater trend, in which countries in the “global south”, particularly those outside of Sub-Saharan Africa, have recently seen their ratios fall much more quickly than countries in Europe, North America, or Northeast Asia. India’s dependency ratio, for example, fell below both the US’s and Germany’s in 2016. So did Bangladesh’s. (Pakistan’s ratio is falling too, but still remains high, around the level of Japan’s). Latin America’s is even lower; it recently became the lowest of any region other than East Asia.

The major country that has had the most significant fall in dependency, however, is Iran:


Of course, age dependency ratios are simplistic. They treat all people above the age of 65 and below the age of 15 as if they were the same, and all people between 15 and 65 years old as if they were the same. Yet if (for example) we were to change the upper limit of working age from 65 to 70, Japan’s dependency ratio would fall substantially as a result, because Japan’s largest age cohort today is 65-70 years old. (Many of these Japanese senior citizens are still in the workforce). If, on the other hand, we were to change the lower limit of working age from 15 to 20, many middle-income countries’ ratios would rise substantially.

A primary lesson that can be learned from the analysis of age dependency ratios is that the common “young population good, old population bad” view of countries’ economic prospects is a misleading one. In reality countries with young populations tend to remain poor, in part because the youngest countries in the world (in Sub-Saharan Africa) are much younger than the oldest countries in the world are old. It will still be a number of decades before aging populations lead Europe or North America to have a higher age dependency ratio than Sub-Saharan Africa. And even that assumes that no unexpected shifts in migration or fertility will occur.

What age dependency ratios do show is two big trends, both of which have to do with middle-income economies. The first trend is the emergence of what we might call a goldilocks belt, located between the aging populations of North America, Europe, and Northeast Asia and the youthful populations of Sub-Saharan Africa. Places in South Asia, North Africa, and Latin America all appear to be in the process of supplanting high-income countries in terms of having the demographic trends that are arguably most conducive to (or at least, indicative of) economic growth.

The second trend is that Northeast Asia’s dependency ratio, which has been the lowest in the world for a generation and probably played a significant role in helping the region emerge from a low-income to middle-income level, bottomed out almost a decade ago and will soon be rising quickly. Japan, in particular, where today the two biggest age cohorts are 65-70 years old and 45-50 years old, might become, 15-20 years from now,  the first developed economy to have a higher dependency burden than Sub-Saharan Africa.

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